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NOTES
VACCINATING AIDS VACCINE
MANUFACTURERS AGAINST PRODUCT
LIABILITY
The unique epidemiology of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) makes vaccine development a daunting task Moreover, in
light of the potential liability arising from adverse side effects,
vaccine manufacturers may be reluctant to invest in costly research
and development. The federal government has authorized programs
to alleviate the burdens of liability on manufacturers of other vac-
cines and to compensate those injured by vaccines through no fault
of the drugs' makers. California has enacted a similar law to
insulate AIDS vaccine manufacturers from liability. While these
laws suggest models for effective programs to protect manufactur-
ers, the programs are not ideally suited for an AIDS vaccines.
This note analyzes the issues which must be addressed in such a
program to insure manufacturer participation in developing and
marketing an AIDS vaccine and to maintain a solvent and efficient
compensation fund for vaccine victims.
I. INTRODUCTION
As of November 1990, more than 150,000 Americans had
been diagnosed as having Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).' The death toll from the disease and related complications
1. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIVIAIDS SURVEIU.LACE REPORT 13 (November
1990) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILAN E REPORT]. AIDS is caused by mfection with a
human mmmunodeficiency virus (HIV). HIV is thought to come from the subfamily of
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is high; more than 94,375 Americans have died as a result.2 Ac-
cording to one estimate, an additional 1.5 million people may
already be infected with HIV.3 The Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) estimates that the number of individuals with AIDS may
increase four-fold in the next three years.4 Understandably, a tre-
mendous push toward development of a vaccine5 to protect the
general population and stop the spread of this disease has been
occurring.
As scientists and medical researchers discover more about
AIDS and approach development of an effective vaccine,
policymakers at the federal and state levels must consider appropri-
ate methods of averting a liability crisis among vaccine manufac-
turers arising from injuries caused by adverse reactions to the
vaccine. On a national level, Congress has faced similar issues on
two occasions: the Swine Flu experience of 19766 and the early
lentiviruses characterized by "slow, progressive infections in which the virus escapes host
immune defenses." David A. Katzenstein et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus, in VAC-
CINES 558 (Edward A. Mortimer & Stanley A. Plotkin eds., 1988). One of the major
problems in developing a cure and stopping the spread of the virus is the variability of
the protective "envelope" which surrounds the IVY. Id. Because this protective coating
can mutate quickly and in an unpredictable manner, researchers are forced to develop a
treatment for a multitude of viruses. Id. at 558-59.
2. HIV/AIDS SURVEILANCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
3. George R. Seage, III et. al., Effect of Changing Patterns of Care and Duration of
Survival on the Cost of Treating the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 80
AM. . PUB. HEALTH 835 (1990).
4. Id.
5. Vaccinations stimulate the body's immune system to produce antibodies against
specific pathogens (disease causing organisms) without development of disease symptoms.
SUBCOMMTTEE ON HEALTH AND THE ENV'T OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS 4 (Comm. Print 1986)
[hereinafter CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS]. The primary method of producing this result is
to introduce into the body small amounts of "modified disease causing agents, which
stimulate the immune system to produce antibodies specific for that disease." Id. Vaccines
can be divided into two major categories: "live" and "killed." Katzenstein, supra note 1,
at 568-70. A live vaccine is characterized by its ability to replicate within the body. Id.
Typically, a live vaccine is a virus which has been attenuated (through chemical, genetic
or other methods of alteration) with respect to its ability to cause the disease, but is still
capable of stimulating antibody production. A "killed" vaccine, on the other hand, is
incapable of replicating within the body, but can still stimulate immunity. Id.
Each type of vaccine carries with it costs and benefits. Live vaccines are known to
produce antibody immunity and also stimulate the cell-mediated immune system, providing
a "broad spectrum of immunity." Id. In addition, live vaccines provide protection longer
than "killed" vaccines. Id. However, live vaccines can potentially revert to a pathogenic
form, leading to development of the disease itself. Id. While "killed" vaccines are nonin-
fectious and less likely to cause adverse reactions, they are also less efficient in producing
cell-mediated immunity and require booster shots to provide long-lasting protection. Id.
6. For a discussion of the Swine Flu experience, see infra text accompanying notes
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1980's supply crisis for childhood vaccines 7 that was precipitated
by several high profile product liability cases which increased
vaccine manufacturers' liability exposure.'
Congress responded to each situation differently. In 1976,
facing an expected epidemic and responding to a demand from
vaccine manufacturers for protection from liability, it developed the
National Swine Flu Immunization Program." Under this program,
the federal government modified the Federal Tort Claims Act,"°
effectively assuming liability for all adverse reactions to the Swine
Flu vaccine not the result of manufacturer negligence or breach of
contract."1
The response to the childhood vaccine crisis was different. In
1986, Congress established the National Vaccine Program to pro-
vide direct and prompt compensation to individuals who suffer
injuries as the result of mandatory childhood vaccination.' Fund-
ing for this program comes from an excise tax levied on each dose
of vaccine administered.13 In order to receive compensation under
the National Vaccine Program, an injured party must waive all
rights to seek recovery from the vaccine manufacturer."
Recognizing vaccine manufacturers' historical concern with
potential liability for vaccine-related injuries and hoping to stimu-
late research into development of an AIDS vaccine, 5 the Califor-
nia legislature enacted comprehensive legislation establishing an
AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund.16 This legislation pro-
vides compensation to individuals experiencing adverse reactions to
83-113. In addition, Neustadt and Fineberg discuss in detail the issues involved in devel-
oping a national vaccination program. RICHARD E. NEUsTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERO,
THE EPIDEMIC THAT NEVER WAS: POLiCY MAKING & THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR (1983).
7. Currently, children are immunized against seven diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, per-
tussis (whooping cough), measles, mumps, rubella (German measles) and polio. CIL.D-
HOOD INMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 5.
8. See infra notes 114-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the childhood
vaccine crisis and the subsequent legislative response.
9. Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976) (authorization expired after one
year).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. at 1114-16.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -33 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
13. The excise tax is authorized by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131-4132.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21.
15. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991) (discussing
the California legislature's rationale for enacting the AIDS vaccine plan).
16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50. See infra notes 144-55 and accompa-
nying text.
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an AIDS vaccine approved by the Food and Drug Administration,
and it guarantees the purchase of at least 500,000 units of the vac-
cine. 7 The compensation fund is this country's first direct re-
sponse to liability and compensation issues likely to arise in con-
junction with development of an AIDS vaccine.' Its design re-
sembles that of the National Vaccine Program.'9
This note examines various alternatives for handling liability
and compensation problems associated with development of an
AIDS vaccine. First, the note reviews the relevant common law
decisions which have set the standard for vaccine manufacturer
liability. Next, previous attempts at limiting vaccine manufacturer
liability are examined. Specifically, this note analyzes the swine flu
and childhood vaccine acts and compares them with the California
legislation. Finally, this note concludes that a vaccine victim's
compensation policy based on an insurance model2' promotes the
dual goals of stimulating an appropriate amount of research into
development of an AIDS vaccine and protecting manufacturers
from unpredictable operating costs.
In order tc. achieve these goals, the method of compensating
victims developed by the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program and adopted and modified by the California legislature
should be further changed to reflect the unique epidemiology of the
AIDS virus. Specifically, the California legislation fails to provide
the flexibility needed to deal with a new disease and vaccine. This
note suggests that a compensation fund which accounts for the
unusual characteristics of the AIDS virus be implemented as the
primary recovery mechanism for those injured by an AIDS vaccine.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF VACCINE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
Vaccines are not completely safe; there is always a chance
that side effects ranging from mild, short-lived discomfort to dis-
abling, life-threatening injuries may occur with administration of
any vaccine.2' However, society has implicitly decided that the
risks of vaccination are worth the benefits produced, and it there-
17. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.51.
18. See i& § 199.45(s) (asserting that California must lead the country in efforts to
facilitate AIDS vaccination).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 146-52.
20. See infra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
21. For a detailed discussion of the risks associated with vaccines see, CHILDHOOD IM-
MUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 21-33.
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fore requires that children be vaccinated before enrolling in public
schools.' Nonetheless, parties injured by these vaccines continue
to seek recovery from vaccine manufacturers.
Injured parties have three common law avenues for bringing a
product liability cause of action against a vaccine manufacturer:'
(1) negligence liability in tort, 4 (2) strict liability for breach of an
express or implied warranty, 2 and (3) strict liability in tort for
physical harm.26 Strict liability differs from negligence liability in
that the former focuses on whether or not the product is defective
while the latter focuses on the manufacturer's conduct.' Under
the doctrine of strict liability, a manufacturer can be liable without
any showing of fault.'
The theory of strict liability was first enunciated in a concur-
ring opinion by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. 29 Under Traynor's rationale, the focus for determining liability
shifted from the manufacturer to the product itself"° based on the
theory that the relationship between manufacturers and consumers
had changed so that consumers "no longer approach products
warily but accept them on faith.... ."" Justice Traynor felt that
in modem business, the manufacturer, not the consumer, was in the
best position to provide protection against dangerous products. 2
The idea of strict product liability expressed in Escola became
law in California with the holding in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc."3 Relying on the rule of Greenman, a plaintiff
could show a manufacturer's liability by demonstrating that (1) an
injury occurred during use of a product in the manner it was in-
22. See Id. at 16-22.
23. W. PAGE KEETON et al., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 99 (5th ed. 1984).
24. Id.
25. For a discussion of breach of warranty claims, see generally JAMES 3. WHnE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
286-95 (1972); ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 235-36
(1970). In addition, much of remedies law in warranty cases is governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-313 (express warranty), § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty), and 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
26. KEETON et al., supra note 23, § 99.
27. ItJ
28. See id (In strict liability, the plaintiff is not required to impugn the conduct of
the maker.-).
29. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 443.
32. Id.
33. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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tended to be used and (2) the injury resulted from a defect in the
design or manufacture of the product of which the plaintiff was not
aware.34 After Greenman, the American Law Institute adopted
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflecting the
rule of strict product liability." Almost every state has adopted
section 402A. 6
The California Supreme Court further defined the doctrine of
strict liability in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.37 and Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.3" In Cronin, the court held that liability
could be imposed when a product was used in a manner reason-
ably foreseeable to the manufacturer, regardless of whether that use
was unintended or improper.39 In addition, the court found the
"unreasonably dangerous" language used in section 402A unneces-
sary' and determined that a mere showing of a manufacturing or
design effect was sufficient to satisfy the conditions of strict prod-
uct liability.4
1
In 1978, Barker defined "design defect" in terms of strict
liability.42 Barker proposed three types of product defects which
could lead to a manufacturer being held strictly liable: (1) a manu-
facturing flaw resulting in a product different than originally
planned by the manufacturer (e.g., an exploding Coca-Cola bottle
as described in Fscola); (2) a design defect such as the absence of
34. Id. at 901.
35. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
36. KEETON et al., supra note 23, § 98.
37. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
38. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
39. 501 P.2d at 1158.
40. Id. at 1162. The court observed that the "unreasonably dangerous" language "rings
of negligence." Id.
41. Id.
42. Barker, 573 P.2d at 453.
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a safety device; and (3) lack of adequate warnings or instructions
on how to use a product safely.4 3
An injured party can more easily state a valid cause of action
under strict liability than under a negligence theory. As a result,
most early suits brought against vaccine manufacturers asserted
claims based on the doctrine of strict liability." However, com-
ment k of Restatement section 402A provides special "protection"
from strict product liability for unavoidably unsafe products.45
Comment k specifically mentions vaccines as an example of such a
product.4
Comment k recognizes the social value of vaccines and pro-
tects .producers who satisfy safe manufacturing requirements when
consumers suffer adverse reactions. Comment k effectively elimi-
nates most claims in strict liability against vaccine manufacturers
43. Id.
44. Robert M. McKenna, Comment, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the De-
velopment of a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 943, 954 (1988).
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, 402A cmt k (1965). Comment k states:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowl-
edge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding exam-
ple is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the
use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning is not defective, nor is it unrea-
sonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the
like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to phy-
sicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recog-
nizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
46. Id. Although comment k indicates that protection from strict liability should be
provided to "many other drugs, vaccines and the like, ... " it does not automatically
extend to all vaccines protection from strict liability. Therefore, in order for a vaccine
manufacturer to avoid strict liability, its vaccine must first be classified as an unavoidably
unsafe product. The criteria for receiving this protection are a subject of considerable
judicial debate. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
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who have shown their products to be unavoidably unsafe. Thus,
with the exception of manufacturing defects such as a "bad" batch
of vaccine, plaintiffs must proceed under a negligence standard and
satisfy courts that defendant vaccine manufacturers have breached a
duty owed to their customers.
Nonetheless, several plaintiffs have been successful in asserting
strict liability claims against vaccine manufacturers. These cases
have focused on the precise meaning of comment k's "proper
directions and warnings" language. Many courts interpreting com-
ment k have found the warning requirement to mean direct manu-
facturer warning to the intended vaccine recipient.47 This rule was
first enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Davis v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries, Inc.48 While the Davis court agreed that vaccines were cov-
ered by comment k, the court held that a manufacturer of the
Sabin polio vaccine"° who knew that warnings of the inherent
risks of the vaccine were not reaching the ultimate consumers had
failed to satisfy its duty to warn.5' The court found the warnings
communicated to the administering physician inadequate because
the vaccine was distributed at a mass immunization clinic where
there were no procedures for assuring that the physician would
47. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding
that the manufacturer is responsible for seeing "that warnings reach the consumner either
by giving warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give warning" where polio vac-
cines are not individually prescribed by physicians); see also Givens v. Lederle Laborato-
ries, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding a drug manufacturer responsible for
directly warning the consumer even if a polio vaccine is administered by a private physi-
cian instead of by a public health clinic); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d
1264, 1275-76 (5th Cir.) (relying on Davis in holding that a polio vaccine manufacturer
has a duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the drug's risk), cert. denied, 114 U.S. 1096
(1974); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 388-89 (NJ. 1984) (concluding
that a manufacturer who knows or should know of a drug's dangers has a duty to warn
prescribing doctors and must warn consumers directly if knowledge of risks is subse-
quently obtained). But see Foyle v. Lederle Laboratories, 674 F. Supp. 530, 533-36
(E.D.N.C. 1987) (absolving the manufacturer of liability under the learned intermediary
doctrine where a physician who administered a DPT vaccine had been warned of the
drug's risks).
48. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 128.
50. The Sabin polio vaccine is a live-virus oral vaccine considered by many to be
superior to the Salk "killed-virus" vaccine for preventing transmission of the disease. The
main advantage of the Sabin vaccine is that it provides both antibody and cell-based
immunity to the polio virus so that recipients do not require the booster shots characteris-
tic of the Salk vaccine. See supra note 5.
51. Davis, 399 F.2d at 130-31.
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communicate the warning to the patients.52
Six years later, in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 3 the
court extended the Davis ruling by holding that failure to provide
an adequate warning constituted a design defect and was sufficient
to hold a manufacturer strictly liable.' The Davis and Reyes
opinions led to decisions in a number of lawsuits finding vaccine
manufacturers liable for failing to provide direct warning of poten-
tial harmful side effects from vaccine use.55 Although in many
cases there was questionable evidence of causation, juries tended to
return verdicts in favor of the injured plaintiffs.'
In later cases, vaccine manufacturers argued that imposing a
duty to warn on the vaccine producer was unfair and often impos-
sible. Manufacturers asserted that administering physicians are in a
better position to inform intended vaccine recipients of the risks
inherent in taking vaccines.5 The manufacturers' argument led
courts to develop the "learned intermediary doctrine." This doctrine
holds that a vaccine manufacturer has a duty to warn administering
physicians, but not vaccine recipients, of foreseeable risks in using
a vaccine.s The learned intermediary doctrine does not prevent
vaccine recipients from bringing actions against manufacturers if a
recipient can prove the manufacturer failed to warn the prescribing
52. Id.
53. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
54. Id. at 1275-77.
55. See, e.g., Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984) (swine flu
vaccine); Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979) (DPT and polio
vaccines); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (Sabin polio vaccine).
56. See McKenna, supra note 44, at 955.
57. See, e.g., Schindler v. Lederle Laboratories, 725 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (6th Cir.
1983) (holding that the "warnings given by [the drug manufacturer] ...were adequate to
put a reasonably competent pediatrician on notice regarding the danger associated with
giving oral polio vaccine to a child suffering from an immunity deficiency"); Stanback v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding an influenza vaccine
manufacturer's warning to doctors sufficient); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718
P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986) (holding warning to a doctor of the polio vaccine's dangers
sufficient); Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 328 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Mich. 1983) (doctors,
not patients, must be warned of the dangers of the polio vaccine).
58. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276. The Reyes court explained that:
where prescription drugs are concerned, the manufacturer's duty to warn is limited
to an obligation to advise the prescribing physician of any potential dangers that
may result from the drug's use .... As a medical expert, the prescribing physician
can take into account the propensitites of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of
his patient . ..Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn ultimate purchasers
of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the cournter, in selling prescription
drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as a "learned
intermediary" between manufacturer and consumer.
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physician adequately of all the risks accompanying vaccine use.59
The learned intermediary doctrine gained broad acceptance in
the early 1980's when several pharmaceutical companies proved
that warnings provided to physicians administering prescription
drugs or vaccines were sufficient to meet the comment k warning
requirement and thus protect the companies from strict liability.60
For instance, in Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories,"' the court re-
versed a judgment for a plaintiff who contracted polio after being
vaccinated, holding that where a doctor must decide whether a pa-
tient should receive treatment with a specific drug or vaccine, "the
doctor, and not the patient, must be warned by the manufacturer"
of potential risks attendant upon use of the product.62 The Kansas
Supreme Court concurred in this view in Johnson v. American
Cyanamid Co.,63 where it found a manufacturer's warning to a
private physician adequate and and refused to hold the manufac-
turer liable under a failure to warn theory.'
The learned intermediary doctrine has been accepted by every
jurisdiction that has examined the duty to warn doctrine. 65 Some
commentators believe that the learned intermediary doctrine will
protect manufacturers of an AIDS vaccine from potential liability
for adverse reactions to such a vaccine.' Their position is pre-
mised on the theory that all recipients of an AIDS vaccine will be
from high risk categories67 and that decisions to immunize will be
made on a patient-by-patient basis.6 Since a decision to immunize
would be the result of a careful balancing of risks and benefits, the
prescribing physician and the recipient would necessarily be fully
59. MARDEN G. DixoN, DRUG PRODUCT LIABu=ITY § 9.02(1) (1986) (describing the
traditional duty of the manufacturer to warn physicians of a drug's possible side effects).
60. McKenna, supra note 44, at 957.
61. 328 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. 1982).
62. Id. at 579.
63. 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986).
64. Id. at 1326.
65. McKenna, supra note 44, at 958.
66. See id. at 956-58. Of course, protection for AIDS vaccine manufacturers by the
learned intermediary doctrine assumes that (1) an AIDS vaccine falls within the comment
k exception to strict liability, (2) there are no manufacturing defects in the vaccine and
(3) warnings to administering physicians are adequate.
67. Individuals considered to be at high risk to contract AIDS include individuals
engaging in unsafe sexual practices, intravenous drug users, persons receiving blood
transfusions and, to a lesser extent, those who have contact with blood and other body
products of persons infected with the virus. HIV\AIDS SURVEI.LANCE REPORT, supra note
1, at 10.
68. McKenna, supra note 44, at 953.
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informed of potential adverse reactions. Under these circumstances,
there would be no question as to whether a manufacturer satisfied
its duty to warn, either directly or through a learned intermedi-
ary.
69
In any case alleging liability by a vaccine manufacturer, the
learned intermediary and direct warning doctrines limit only that
liability based on a breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn
noted in comment k. Moreover, these doctrines can be employed to
shield vaccine manufacturers from strict product liability only if an-
other comment k criterion - classification of the vaccines as un-
avoidably unsafe - is also satisfied.7" The holding in Kearl v.
Lederle Laboratories7 ' suggests one test to determine whether a
vaccine, or any other drug, deserves comment k protection.
Recognizing that no widely-accepted method for determining
whether or not a product merited comment k protection existed, the
Kearl court proposed the following test:
A trial court should take evidence as to: (1) whether, when
distributed, the product was intended to confer an excep-
tionally important benefit that made its availability highly
desirable; (2) whether the then-existing risk posed by the
product both was "substantial" and "unavoidable"; [sic] and
(3) whether the interest in availability (again measured as
of the time of distribution) outweighs the interest in pro-
moting enhanced accountability through strict liability de-
sign defect review.72
Before rejecting strict liability arguments, trial courts must
determine if each element of this test is satisfied.73 Furthermore,
the Kearl court held that even if all requirements of the test were
met, manufacturers would be exempt only from strict liability for
69. Id. If mass immunization for AIDS were required, the learned intermediary would
probably not protect manufacturers because administering physicians and vaccine recipients
in this setting do not interact in a way that warnings are likely to be communicated. In
this case, a vaccine manufacturer would have to satisfy the courts that a sufficient warn-
ing had actually been given to recipients.
70. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
71. 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Brown v. Superior Court, 751
P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). The Kearl court reversed a jury award of $800,000 for a child
who contracted polio after being vaccinated and remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to determine whether or not the the polio vaccine was an "unavoidably un-
safe" product under comment k.
72. Id. at 464.
73. Id.
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design defects; a plaintiff could pursue an action under a negli-
gence theory or under strict liability for manufacturing defects.74
In Brown v. Superior Court,75 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia acknowledged the merit in the Kearl court's endeavor, but
nevertheless overruled the result.76 The Brown court admitted that
"[i]f some method could be devised to confine the benefit of the
comment k negligence standard to those drugs that proved useful
to mankind while denying [the comment k] privilege to those that
are clearly harmful, it would deserve serious consideration."77
However, the court concluded that no method of identifying such
drugs had been developed which would not "substantially impairi]
the public interest in the development and marketing of new
drugs."78 The court's criticism of the Kearl test focused on the
subjective discretion it gave to trial judges for determining "what
constitutes an 'exceptionally important benefit' of a drug."79
The Brown court's determination to provide comment k protec-
tion for all drugs reflects a policy geared at providing incentives
for manufacturers to continue research into new treatments and
cures for various illnesses. The court was concerned that the possi-
bility of manufacturers being held strictly liable would deter the
marketing of new products for fear of "large adverse monetary
judgments.""0 Furthermore, the court was concerned that the ad-
ditional cost of insuring against such liability might place the cost
of obtaining new medicines out of reach of those most in need of
them.8 1
m11. LEGISLATIVE ArrEMPTS TO LIMIT MANUFACTURER LLABILrry
The common law has developed to a point where a vaccine
manufacturer who produces a high quality vaccine and provides
adequate warning of potential side effects will generally be shield-
ed from strict liability for design and warning defects. While this
provides many manufacturers with protection from large judgments,
74. Id. at 465.
75. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). The Brown court held that comment k may be applied
to a prescription drug without a finding by the trial court that the drug is unavoidably
dangerous. The plaintiff's claim was based on injuries caused by use of DES.
76. Id. at 482.
77. Id. at 481.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 482.
80. Id. at 479.
81. Id.
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it does not prevent injured plaintiffs from bringing claims against
them. The rising litigation costs manufacturers incur to defend
these suits could encourage some manufacturers to leave the vac-
cine market.8 2 Likewise, common law decisions do not solve the
problem of providing relief for those individuals who are injured
by use of an unavoidably unsafe vaccine. This section discusses
various attempts to provide compensation to those victims.
A. The Swine Flu Epidemic of 1976
In October 1976, facing an expected epidemic outbreak of an
influenza strain known as swine flu, Congress enacted legislation 3
geared toward providing Swine Flu vaccine manufacturers with
immunity from liability for injuries caused by adverse reactions to
the vaccine.' In total, Congress appropriated almost $135 million
for the program. 5 As of 1985, the federal government, which had
assumed liability for adverse reactions to the vaccine, had incurred
legal costs of close to $100 million, pushing the program well over
its initial budget.
8 6
The swine flu experience began with the identification of flu
traceable to the swine flu virus in four army recruits at Fort Dix,
New Jersey.' The strain of flu was similar to one which caused
20 million deaths worldwide.8 Public health officials were ex-
tremely concerned about the possibility of a similar outbreak be-
cause there was evidence that the recruits could have been infected
through human-to-human contact.8 9 Recognizing the potential for
crisis, the public health bureaucracy advised President Ford that a
82. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 72.
83. The National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90
Stat. 1113 (1976) (authorization expired after one year).
84. In order to insure the continued production, distribution and administration of the
swine flu vaccine, Congress "protect[ed] agencies, organizations, and individuals [involved
in those activities] against liability for other than their own negligence to persons alleging
personal injury or death arising out of the administration of such vaccine." Id. at 1114.
85. Thomas E. Baynes, Jr. Liability for Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Con-
siderations and Some Reflections on the Swine Flu Experience, 21 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 44,
62 (1977) [hereinafter Baynes].
86. See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Federal Compensation for Vaccination Induced Injuries,
13 B.C. ENV7L. AFF. L. REV. 169, 185 (1986) (noting that $100 million of the total
original appropriation was alloted to purchase the vaccine and that legal fees had almost
reached that amount as well).
87. See NEUSTADT & FaERG, supra note 6, at 18.
88. IdE
89. Id
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large scale immunization program was necessary to avert an epi-
demic. On March 24, 1976, Ford announced to the nation his
intent to seek the inoculation of "every man, woman, and child in
the United States."9°
After the influenza strain responsible for the swine flu had
been isolated and identified, drug manufacturers and public health
officials collaborrated to develop a vaccine for it.9 The vaccine
was ready to be distributed as early as July 1976,92 well in ad-
vance of the October 1976 deadline after which the usefulness of
the vaccine as a preventive mechanism would decrease drastically.
However, the drug manufacturers, on advice of their insurance
companies, refused to release the vaccine to the federal govern-
ment.93 The insurance industry, reacting primarily to the decision
in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,' refused to insure the vaccine
manufacturers and the manufacturers, in turn, refused to dispense
the vaccine without insurance coverage.
95
Facing a fast approaching deadline for dispensing the vaccine,
Congress considered a number of methods for alleviating the in-
surance industry's and vaccine manufacturers' concerns. Of the
many alternatives suggested, two received the most serious con-
sideration. The first was to have the federal government indemnify
the vaccine manufacturers except where there was negligence in
manufacturing or failure to satisfy contractual obligations. The
second was to have the government reinsure the insurance compa-
nies which provided coverage to the vaccine manufacturers.'
Eventually, Congress settled the controversy by amending the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FT7CA) 9 to allow those injured by the vac-
90. Id at 46. For a detailed analysis of the political and scientific issues involved in
the development and implementation of the swine flu vaccination program, see generally
NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 6.
91. Baynes, supra note 85, at 63.
92. See 122 CONG. REC. 26,807 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rogers) (emphasizing the
importance of implementing of an immunization program prior to a fall or winter epidem-
ic outbreak).
93. Id. The federal government was to be solely responsible for distributing the vac-
cine. Id.
94. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
95. See Baynes, supra note 85, at 64; Reitze, supra note 86, at 175.
96. Baynes, supra note 85, at 66.
97. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.
The Federal Tort Claims Act is the statute which allows the United States
government to be sued for the tortious act of its employers. Prior to enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, the only form of citizen redress had
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cine to seek recovery directly from the federal government.98
Under this scheme, parties were required to seek recovery for
injuries caused by adverse reactions to the vaccine through use of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. However, the following exceptions to
the FTCA applied: (1) recovery from the United States could be
based on any theory of liability recognized in the state where inju-
ry from vaccination occurred; (2) discretionary function immunity
could not be used as a defense by the United States; and (3) the
prejudice of the FTCA against plaintiffs who fail to file an admin-
istrative claim as a preliminary step to litigation was altered.99
Although the federal government accepted liability for injuries
resulting from swine flu vaccinations, the United States retained the
right to seek indemnification from the vaccine manufacturers for
negligence in manufacturing and breach of contract. This necessitat-
ed that vaccine manufacturers insure themselves for liability arising
from negligence."
By enacting this legislation, Congress guaranteed that the swine
flu vaccine would be available for use before the illness became a
public health problem. As soon as the vaccine was released by the
manufacturers, the general public, at the urging of health officials,
lined up to receive their shots. By the time the program ended on
December 16, 1976, more than 40 million individuals were immu-
nized."°' Soon after the mass immunization program began, there
were reports of adverse side effects. The most common injury was
been to file a private bill in Congress. The Act was designed to stem the tide
of private congressional bills by establishing a judicial remedy for the torts of
federal government employers.
Frank H. Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Conn. B.J. 224,
224 (1989).
98. Reitze, supra note 86, at 178-79.
99. See, Baynes, supra note 85, at 67. The exceptions ensured that all parties injured
by the Swine Flu vaccine had a mechanism for recovery. Id. The first exception provided
an opportunity for recovery under the product liability laws of every state. Id. The second
exception was necessary because, in cases brought under the FTCA, the federal govern-
ment cannot ordinarily be held liable for the discretionary actions of one of its employ-
ees. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Thus, without this exception, victims could not seek recovery if
the individual administering the swine flu vaccine was acting in a "discretionary fashion."
Id. Finally, by relaxing the procedural aspects of the FCA, those parties who filed suit
against vaccine manufacturers in state courts were not prejudiced from refiling their claims
in compliance with the requirements of the FrCA and the Swine Flu Act. Baynes, supra
note 85, at 67.
100. See Baynes, supra note 85, at 68. The federal government can recover from a
manufacturer all costs, judgments and settlements arising from the manufacturer's negli-
gence or breach of contract.
101. Reitze, supra note 86, at 179.
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Guillian-Barr6 Syndrome."° This devastating disease has been the
primary injury for which recovery under the Swine Flu Program
has been sought.
By 1985, the number of administrative claims brought under
the Swine Flu Program reached 4,165.03 At least 1,604 lawsuits
for vaccine-related injuries were filed after administrative claims
were denied."° The cost of those cases which have settled or in
which judgments have been awarded had reached approximately
$83 million. 5 As the remaining cases are handled, it is clear
that this number will continue to increase.
As the first modem attempt to develop a comprehensive and
large-scale immunization program, the Swine Flu experience of-
fered valuable lessons. For example, the president, Congress and
the public health establishment were "forced" to make decisions
without complete information about the epidemiology of the dis-
ease.'06 In addition, the president and Congress were not fully
informed of changes in scientific data and in the opinions of ex-
perts about how to proceed with immunization.07 This suggests
that future immunization programs should include a formal, ongo-
ing review process in which the assumptions and expert opinions
102. Guillain-Barr6 Syndrome causes acute or subacute severe human paralysis. Dov
Saffer, et al., Epidemiology of Guillian-Barrd Syndrome, 28 NEURoLOGY 686, 688 (1978).
It is believed to result from an immunological attack on the peripheral nerves. MERCK,
SHARP & DOHME RESEARCH LABORATORIES, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND
THERAPY 1386 (14th ed. 1982).
103. Reitze, supra note 86, at 184.
104. Id
105. Id at 185..
106. NEUSTADT & FINEBERO, supra note 6, at 116-22. The sudden nature of the ex-
pected epidemic and lack of solid information about the epidemiology of the swine flu
virus were major factors in the decision to implement a nationwide immunization plan. In
particular, lack of solid data led many experts to endorse mass immunization even though
they had reservations concerning the need for such a step. Id.
In addition, the perception of the media and the public played a large role in the
development of the immunization policy. Id. at 127-29. For example, as Congress was
debating the appropriate method of handling liability from mass immunizations, several
hotel guests in Philadelphia contracted Legionnaire's Disease and died. This outbreak in-
creased pressure on politicians to reach a consensus; within twelve days of the outbreak,
President Ford had signed the amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act under which the
government accepted liability for adverse reactions to swine flu immunizations. Id. at 85-
87. Although it is not certain that Congress would not have reached the same conclusion
without the, outbreak of Legionnaire's Disease, the timing of the liability scheme's passage
raises the possibility that Congress acted out of fear and uncertainty without fully con-
sidering all the ramifications of its decision.
107. Id. at 117.
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upon which action is predicated can be continually reevaluated.1°"
The swine flu experience suggests that government should
proceed carefully when dealing with a disease which is not well
understood and where scientific knowledge is incomplete."19 In
recommending a large-scale immunization program, public health
officials lost sight of the fact that they did not have a complete
understanding of the swine flu virus."1 Their experience treating
and preventing more common diseases such as measles and polio
served as the basis for their recommendations."i However, reli-
ance on such information was not adequate to predict the potential
for adverse reactions to the swine flu vaccine1 or the liabilityexpenses which the federal government experienced." 3
108. Id. The value of an ongoing review process lies in maintaining a continuing debate
about the need for government action. As more information becomes available, the appro-
priate course of action may change. For instance, throughout the political and scientific
debate surrounding a swine flu immunization program, little attention was given to the
fact that there was only one reported case of swine flu anywhere in the United States. Id.
at 94. In hindsight, experts now believe that if that information had received the attention
it deserved, the large-scale immunization program could have been geared to treat only
those in high risk categories, the elderly and children. Id. at 104.
109. Id. at 132-37. Neustadt and Fineberg conclude that swine flu was a "slippery dis-
ease" because of the lack of information available regarding the number of actual cases,
effective treatments, symptoms of the disease, the possibility of other ailments mimicking
the underlying ailment and the year-to-year impact of the virus on the general population.
Id. Comparing swine flu to other targets of government immunization (for example, child-
hood diseases) highlights the vast differences in knowledge regarding the "newer" swine
flu. Id.
Like swine flu, AIDS qualifies as a "slippery disease;" scientific knowledge is se-
verely limited and the epidemiology of the disease is not yet fully understood. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text. Thus, the lessons taught by the swine flu immunization
program are directly applicable to the development of an effective AIDS vaccine policy.
The drafters of an AIDS immunization plan should avoid the mistakes made by those
handling the swine flu situation. In particular, the government should be hesitant to accept
unlimited liability for an immunization program in which all the risks are not known, and
public health officials should not rely solely on established methods of treatment until
such time as they have been proven effective.
110. NEUSTADT & FNEERG, supra note 6, at 132-33.
111. Id. at 134.
112. See Reitze, supra note 86, at 179, 182-84. The connection between the swine flu
vaccine and Guillian-Barr6 Syndrome was unknown at the time the swine flu program
commenced. Had the connection been known before the program was implemented, addi-
tional research may have produced a safer vaccine or, in the alternative, a different com-
pensation plan for injured individuals might have been devised.
113. See Reitze, supra note 86, at 185 (suggesting that the total litigation cost to the
government including settled claims, verdicts, and administrative costs was $83,233,714).
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B. National Childhood Vaccination Program
Unlike the swine flu situation, childhood vaccinations have
been a fact of life for years and the underlying diseases are well
understood. 114 Thus, lawmakers had had cause to debate the issue
of whether a national vaccination policy was necessary and if so,
how it should be designed. Nevertheless, Congress had not settled
on any plan when vaccine manufacturers began to pull out of the
market in 1967."5 It was not until early 1984 when the nation
faced a short term disruption in the supply of the DTP vaccine that
the withdrawal of manufacturers from this market became a cause
for concern." 6 Although the DTP vaccine supply crisis was re-
solved without substantial interruption of normal immunization
plans, 1 ' it was the impetus Congress needed to enact legislation
to safeguard the nation's supply of childhood vaccines."'
Drug manufacturers chose to leave the vaccine market for a
114. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Childhood immunizations begin at the
age of approximately two months with the oral polio vaccine (OPV) and a combined
vaccine for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTP). CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra
note 5, at 17-20. At 15 months, the vaccine for measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) is
administered. id.
115. INSTITuM OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 46 (1985) [hereinafter
VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION]. In 1984, there were 15 institutions licensed to pro-
duce and distribute vaccines in the United States, eight of which were licensed to produce
vaccines for childhood diseases. CHILDHOOD ImMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 67. The
eight producers of childhood vaccines include four commercial enterprises (Connaught
Laboratories Inc.; Lederle Laboratories, a Division of the American Cyanamid Co.; Merck,
Sharp & Dohme, a Division of Merck & Co., Inc,; and Wyeth Laboratories, a Division of
American Home Products Corp), two State governments (Bureau of Laboratories, Michigan
Department of Public Health and Massachusetts Public Health Biologics Laboratory) and
two foreign producers (the Instituto Sieroterapico Vaccinogeno Tuscano Sclavo in Italy and
the Wellcome Foundation, Ltd. in Britain). VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra, at
161-62.
116. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 68-70. The DTP supply crisis re-
sulted from the combination of manufacturers withdrawing from the market or delaying
production because they were unable to obtain liability insurance and quality control prob-
lems one manufacturer experienced with two batches of vaccine. Id. The crisis was re-
solved only after Lederle Laboratories agreed to market DTP vaccine manufactured by
Wyeth Laboratories, which had decided to leave the DTP market, and after Connaught
Laboratories obtained liability insurance. Id.
117. Id. at 70.
118. The DTP supply crisis highlighted the limited sources for certain childhood vac-
cines. For instance, in 1985 Merck, Sharp & Donne was the only supplier of measles,
mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccines while Lederle Laboratories was the only supplier of
the inactivated oral polio vaccine (OPV) and Connaught Laboratories was the only pro-
ducer of the inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). Id. at 67.
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number of reasons. Among the most common reasons cited were
the small market for vaccines," 9 the high cost of entry into the
market with a new product"r and skyrocketing litigation costs
and damage awards for injuries resulting from the use of childhood
vaccines.2 In response to the crisis situation which existed with
the dwindling stockpile of childhood vaccines and in order to stem
the flow of vaccine manufacturers from the market, Congress en-
acted the National Vaccine Program in 1986.12
The objective of the National Vaccine Program is "to achieve
optimal prevention of human infectious diseases through immu-
nization and to achieve optimal prevention against adverse reactions
to vaccines."" 3 To this end, the major goals of the Program are:
1. improving coordination of vaccine research, develop-
ment, use and evaluation;
2. assuring an adequate supply of vaccines;
3. assessing benefits and risks of vaccines and ensuring
that the public and practitioners are aware of the benefits
and risks;
4. ensuring adequate regulatory capacity to evaluate
119. In 1982, the aggregate sales of vaccines in the United States was $172 million. Id.
at 72. In comparison, a survey by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association indicates
that total pharmaceutical sales for 1982 reached almost $14 billion. VACCINE SUPPLY &
INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 49. One reason for the relatively small size of the vac-
cine market is that most vaccines provide life-long immunity and do not require booster
shots. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 72. Therefore, the market for vac-
cines varies with the number of children needing immunizations. Id. It is possible that
vaccine manufacturers were leaving the market simply because they could foresee a stable
market with limited potential for profits and potentially large liability costs. Id. at 72-73,
85.
120. The Institute of Medicine estimates that developing a new vaccine costs between
$20-30 million. VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 45.
121. CHILDHOOD IMMUNI-ATIONS, supra note 5, at 72. A survey of vaccine manufac-
turers conducted by the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment found that
between January 1980 and March 1985, 299 lawsuits were filed against childhood vaccine
manufacturers for injuries allegedly caused by vaccines. Id. at 86. These suits resulted in
compensatory damages of $2.5 billion and punitive damages of $960 million. Id. Of the
suits that had been settled or adjudicated during the period of the survey, manufacturers
paid at least $16.2 million. Id. at 87. Litigation costs (not covered by insurance) for 1983
and 1984 were estimated at $4.7 million and $9.8 million, respectively. Id. The holdings
in the Davis and Reyes cases have been identified as instrumental in the explosion of
vaccine liability litigation. See James A. Newhard, Note, Immunity From AIDS Awaits
Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: How Products Liability Law May Affect the Devel-
opment of an AIDS Vaccine, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 897-908 (1988).
122. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3755 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -33).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1.
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vaccines;
5. improving surveillance of adverse events;
6. establishing research priorities;
7. promoting rapid development and introduction of
improved pertussis vaccines; and
8. ensuring optimal immunization levels in all high risk
and target groups.2
As part of the Act, Congress developed the National Vaccine Inju-
ry Compensation Program."z The compensation fund is "a no-
fault, nontort compensation alternative for individuals injured by
compulsory childhood immunization."
126
Under the Act's compensation program, an individual who is
injured after receiving one of the compulsory childhood vaccines is
automatically entitled to compensation if the injury suffered is
listed on the Vaccine Injury Table.27 Injuries not listed on the
Table or those occuring outside the statutory time-frame are evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis. 121
To be eligible for compensation, a plaintiff must file a petition
with the United States Claims Court. 9 This petition must be ac-
companied by affidavits or supporting documentation indicating that
the petitioner sustained an injury listed on the Vaccine Injury Ta-
ble.' Compensation will be awarded if the special master or
court reviewing the petition finds that the petitioner has "demon-
strated by a preponderance of the evidence" that his or her injury
was the result of receiving a compulsory childhood vaccine."'
Compensation is divided into four categories: medical and
rehabilitative care, a death benefit ($250,000), lost earnings and
pain and suffering ($250,000).132 Notably, the compensation pro-
gram does not allow recovery for punitive or exemplary damag-
124. Alan R. Hinman, The National Vaccine Program and the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 633, 634 (1989) (analyzing the Na-
tional Vaccine Program's objectives as mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -33.
126. Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986:
A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REv. 149, 149-50 (1988).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (listing injuries and times for manifestation of symptoms
after vaccination).
128. Id. § 300aa-16.
129. Id § 300aa-11(a)(1).
130. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(a).
131. Id. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(A).
132. Id. § 300aa-15.
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es.133 In order to receive compensation under this program, peti-
tioners must waive all rights to bring suit against the vaccine man-
ufacturer."s However, a petitioner not satisfied with compensation
under the program may irrevocably reject his right to such com-
pensation and file suit directly against the vaccine manufactur-
er.
135
The compensation program is funded by an excise tax on vac-
cines which became effective in January 1988.136 To insure the
solvency of the trust fund established for the program, the number
of compensation "awards" is limited to 150 per year.' 37 If the
number of "awards" exceeds this amount, all persons in the system
will continue to be eligible for compensation, but no new petitions
will be considered. However, recovery under traditional tort law
theories remains available.
13
Since the National Vaccine Program is relatively new, its effec-
tiveness is difficult to judge. However, available data indicate that,
as of July 17, 1990, $56.8 million had been awarded to petitioners
and attorney fees and legal costs had reached only $1.6 million,
133. Id. § 300aa-15(d). Section 300aa-15(g) also prohibits payment of compensation un-
der the Program for any service or item to the extent that payment has been made or is
expected from a state compensation program, an insurance policy, any state or federal
health benefits program or from an organization providing prepaid health care. Further, the
trust fund from which compensation is paid is "subrogated to all rights of the petitioner
with respect to vaccine-related injury or death for which compensation was paid.... " Id.
§ 300aa-17.
134. Id. § 300aa-21 ("If a person elects to receive compensation [under the Pro-
gram] ... such person may not bring or maintain a civil action for damages .... ).
135. Id. § 300aa-21. The Act holds that all applicable state laws shall apply if an in-
jured party chooses to seek recovery directly from a vaccine manufacturer. Id. § 300aa-
22(a). However, the federal statute also holds that "[n]o vaccine manufacturer shall be
liable in a civil action for damages ...if the injury or death resulted from side effects
that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompa-
nied by proper directions and warnings." Id. at § 300aa-22(b). In addition, the federal
statute prohibits an injured party from recovering under a direct warning theory. Id.
§ 300aa-22(c). Thus, the National Vaccine Program effectively limits recovery from manu-
facturers to cases involving manufacturing defects or failure to warn learned intermediaries
adequately. These limitations highlight one of the policy rationales behind the statute -
to limit manufacturer liability by making recovery through the compensation program at-
tractive to injured parties.
136. Funding is authorized by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131-4132.
137. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391(1), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 693, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-367. The program is automatically terminated if compensation is
awarded to more than 150 recipients in a year. The number of expected severe reactions
to vaccines is based on a methodology adopted by the American Academy of Pediatrics.
Id. at 693-94, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-367 to -368.
138. See id. at 695, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-369.
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approximately three percent of the total awarded.'3 9 In addition,
vaccine prices have stabilized and some vaccine manufacturers who
had left the market are considering re-entry."4
The National Vaccine Program and the Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program have provided a unique method of promoting
benefits of mass immunization while affording some protection for
individuals injured by childhood vaccines. The National Vaccine
Program recognizes that mass immunization benefits society by
ensuring a healthier population and reducing health care costs.
1 41
In addition, the Program acknowledges that as a result of this poli-
cy, a certain number of individuals will inadvertently be injured
each year by immunizations. 142 Although compensation under the
plan cannot make these injured individuals "whole," it does ensure
relatively quick compensation as compared to recovery through the
courts.
The Program also recognizes that compensation through the
trust fund will not always be adequate. 43 Thus, plaintiffs retain
the right to sue manufacturers directly. This right is important for
two reasons. First, an injured party who is not satisfied with com-
pensation awarded under the program can seek a larger judgment
directly from a manufacturer. Second, in those instances where the
injury is the result of manufacturer negligence, the manufacturer
will be forced to bear without government assistance those costs
which it has imposed on others. Allowing recovery for negligence
directly from manufacturers provides an incentive to manufacturers
to continue producing safe, high quality vaccines.
Moreover, in theory, the National Vaccine Program creates a
more stable market for vaccine manufacturers. The compensation
program provides relief to those parties who are injured without
fault on the part of the manufacturer, thereby reducing the number
of cases and lowering legal costs. In addition, because manufactur-
ers are better able to predict their costs, they may be less hesitant
139. Andrew Blum, Plaintiffs Refile Suits on Vaccine, NAT'L L.L, Oct. 1, 1990 at 3.
140. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2235. It is unclear whether those manufacturers considering re-entry into the
vaccine market are doing so because of the National Vaccine Program, which presumably
has lead to more predictable costs of doing business, or because of potential opportunities
for an expanding market as the number of children increases.
141. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345.
142. Id
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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to enter or remain in the vaccine market, stabilizing the vaccine
supply.
C. California AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund
Recognizing the experience of childhood vaccine manufacturers,
the California legislature enacted a statute in 1986 to provide an
incentive for vaccine manufacturers to develop and produce a vac-
cine for the AIDS virus. " In addition, this statute established a
fund to compensate those injured by use of an approved vac-
cine. 4 Although this program is modeled after the National Vac-
cine Program,"4 there are some significant differences.
The California act is designed with the specific goal of devel-
oping an effective AIDS vaccine.47 To this end, the legislation
takes a two-step approach. First, it guarantees a market for any
FDA approved vaccine. 4 Second, the law attempts to limit liti-
gation costs manufacturers may face by compensating those injured
by the vaccine. 49 Under the program, an injured party receives
compensation of up to $550,000 for personal injuries, lost income,
and pain and suffering."5 The compensation fund is to be main-
144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.45-51. In its comprehensive findings, the
California legislature determined that vaccine manufacturers often faced severe hurdles
when deciding to enter the vaccine marketplace. Among the chief concerns cited by the
legislature were: "uncertain profitability and perceived and actual marketplace risks and
disincentives," id. § 199.45(1); the high cost (estimated by the legislature to be between
$10 and $30 million) of developing a new vaccine, id. § 199.45(n)(1); and an uncertain
market for an AIDS vaccine once developed and approved, id. § 199.45(n)(2).
145. Id. § 199.50.
146. Like the federal program, the California plan attempts to encourage manufacturers
to develop and market an AIDS vaccine by providing for fixed levels of compensation for
injured parties funded by an excise tax on the vaccine. Id
147. Among the findings and declaraiions included in the law's introductory section, the
legislature noted its commitment to work on an AIDS vaccine. "Because an AIDS vaccine
provides an exceptionally important public benefit, it is in the public interest to take
uncommon action to facilitate the development and production of such a vaccine." Id.
§ 199.45(g). The legislature concluded this section by declaring, "[i]t is therefore fitting
and proper that the State of California enact uncommon and exceptional legislation in
order to prevent the further spread of the AIDS epidemic." Id. § 199.45(t).
148. California guarantees that at least 175,000 people will be vaccinated and that with-
in three years of the initial marketing of an AIDS vaccine, at least 500,000 units of the
vaccine will have been purchased from all manufacturers. Id. § 199.51(a). If 500,000 units
are not purchased throughout the United States, the State will acquire the remaining units
at a cost of no more than $20 per dosage. Id.
149. See id § 199.50 (establishing the AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund).
150. Id. § 199.50(b)(3). Compensation under the act is not available for injuries result-
ing from the comparative negligence of the injured party, the negligence of the vaccine
manufacturer or for injuries occurring during a clinical trial. Id. § 199.50(c)(1)-(3).
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tamined by a surcharge of no more than $10 on each dose of vac-
cine dispensed in California.15' The compensation fund is subro-
gated to any claim an injured party receiving compensation is
otherwise entitled to assert. The fund may also seek indemnity for
compensation it provides from third parties found to be liable for
injuries resulting from use of an AIDS vaccine. 52
The most obvious difference between the California Act and
the National Vaccine Program is that an injured party can seek
recovery concurrently from both the compensation fund and the
vaccine manufacturer.'53 Unlike the National Vaccine Program
which effectively acts as an insurance fund, the California plan
provides for victims' compensation through both an insurance
mechanism and recovery in tort." The apparent rationale of the
California scheme is to ensure that injured parties have a quick
method of compensation for any injuries sustained while allowing
the injured party to seek additional compensation directly from the
vaccine manufacturer.155
Although the effectiveness of the California plan cannot be
assessed until an AIDS vaccine has been manufactured and mar-
keted, the plan offers some insight into development of a compre-
hensive AIDS vaccination policy.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Any strategy developed to combat the AIDS virus will neces-
sarily be complicated. The epidemiology of the virus is not well
understood,'56 no effective treatment has yet been identified,'
151. Id. § 199.50(o). The AIDS Vaccine Injury Compensation Policy Review Task Force
created by the act is directed to study and recommend an appropriate amount for the
surcharge. Id.
152. Id. § 199.50(k).
153. Id. § 199.50(m) (providing that the fund shall be entitled to a lien in the amount
of any payments made to the injured party by the fund on the judgment, award or set-
tlement obtained against a manufacturer).
154. The National Vaccine Program allows an injured party to seek recovery directly
from a vaccine manufacturer only after waiving rights to any compensation from the
National Compensation Fund. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a)(1). See supra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text.
155. A successful plaintiff is entitled to keep any compensation paid by the manufac-
turer in excess of the fund's lien for payments made from it to the plaintiff. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(m).
156. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. See also Wendy K. Mariner & Robert
C. Gallo, Getting to Market: The Scienific and Legal Climate for Developing an AIDS
Vaccine, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTHCARE 17, 17-20 (1987) (discussing various methods of
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and many in society continue to view those afflicted with the dis-
ease with disdain because of the common means. by which the
AIDS virus is transmitted.158 Although the scientific community
continues to work on developing a vaccine for the disease, there is
no clear indication about when one will be available.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the childhood vaccine supply
crisis 59 and the Swine Flu experience,"6 when or if an AIDS
vaccine is developed, manufacturers may be hesitant to release it
for fear of potential liability. Thus, it is imperative that a compre-
hensive policy be developed before another vaccine "crisis" arises.
Two potential strategies exist for handling the legal issues
associated with providing an AIDS vaccine for general public use.
The first option is to rely solely on the tort system for compensa-
tion of parties injured by an AIDS vaccine. In such a system the
government would not be involved and the common law would
provide relief for aggrieved parties. The second option is to imple-
ment some type of government-sponsored insurance program. 6
The Swine Flu Program, the National Vaccination Program and the
California AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund are examples
of possible insurance approaches which may satisfy the goals of a
comprehensive AIDS vaccination policy.
A. Common Law Methods of Recovery
The traditional tort system is based on the premise that by
making parties responsible for the consequences of their activities,
the parties will be encouraged to act in the most efficient manner
possible. 62 Thus, a vaccine manufacturer held liable for injuries
caused by its vaccines should internalize the costs of such injuries
producing an AIDS vaccine).
157. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved two drugs for treatment of
AIDS. Zidovudine (commonly called AZT) has been used to treat AIDS patients for sev-
eral years. FDA DRUG BUL. (Special AIDS Issue), Sept. 1987, 19. FDA granted condi-
tional approval of dideoxyinosine, or didanosine, (DDI) in October 1991. Malcolm
Gladwell, Second AIDS Drug Given Conditional Approval, WASH. PosT, Oct. 10, 1991, at
A4. Final approval of DDI depends on the results of clinical studies due out in the
spring of 1992. Ld.
158. Seventy-six percent of infected individuals were exposed to HIV through homo-
sexuallbisexual contact among men or by sharing intravenous (IV) drug needles.
HIVIAIDS SURVEMLANCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
159. See supra notes 114-43 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 204-34.
162. KEETON et al., supra note 23, § 4.
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and incorporate those costs into its production and marketing deci-
sions.
In theory, this rationale is sound. As long as injured parties are
able to show that a vaccine manufacturer has breached a duty of
care to its customers, those plaintiffs will be entitled to compensa-
tion for their injuries. However, the theory underlying common law
recovery deteriorates when all the costs and benefits of immuniza-
tion are considered. For example, problems of proof and variations
in traditional common law rules can deny injured plaintiffs com-
pensation." Moreover, the effects of tort actions extend beyond
the parties to individual cases. Vaccine manufacturers anticipating
increased costs due to liability may elect to halt production of vac-
cines,16 a decision which could lead to layoffs and to an inade-
quate supply of vaccines available to the public. Finally, the tort
system subjects defendant vaccine manufacturers to the possibility
they will be held responsible for harms they did not cause."
1. Burden of Proof
In any cause of action for recovery from a vaccine manufactur-
er, the burden of proving a causal relationship between use of a
vaccine and injury falls on the injured party. Often this element is
not difficult to establish. For instance, injuries resulting from use
of certain childhood vaccines are well documented" and
occurences of Guillian-Barr6 Syndrome following the swine flu
immunization program were quickly traced to the vaccine. 7
163. See infra text accompanying notes 166-72.
164. Although some would argue that a vaccine manufacturer which expects to incur
liability for adverse reactions to a vaccine can recoup those costs by increasing the price
of its goods, there are limits to the success of this strategy. For instance, consuners may
be unwilling or unable to pay the increased costs or government regulations may limit
what a manufacturer can charge customers. See generally William D. Douglas, Vicarious
Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. 584, 720 (1929) (discussing issues
involved in shifting risks to the public).
165. For example, recent studies suggest that the causal relationship believed to exist
between the childhood vaccine for pertussis and serious brain injury may not be valid.
See Gerald S. Golden, Pertussis Vaccine and Injury to the Brain, 116 L PEDIATRICS 854
(1990) (study showing no evidence of increased risk for seizures following DPT vaccine);
Marie R. Griffin et al., Risk of Seizures and Encephalopathy After Immunization with the
Diphtheria-Tetanus-Perrussis Vaccine, 263 JAMA 1641 (1990) (concluding that new data
do not support the existence of pertussis vaccine encephalopathy). See infra notes 181-84
and accompanying text.
166. See CHILDHOOD IMMUN17ATIONS, supra note 5, at 21. See also supra notes 83-113.
167. See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 6, at 100 (reporting that those receiving
the swine flu vaccine were 11 times more likely to contract Guillian-Barr6 Syndrome than
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However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that
vaccines are often unavoidably unsafe products and that a man-
ufacturer should not be strictly liable for injuries resulting from use
of a properly designed and manufactured vaccine."6 Recent deci-
sions with respect to vaccine manufacturers' liability suggest courts
are unwilling to extend notions of strict liability beyond established
lines in this area."6 Thus, a plaintiff is now likely to face the
onerous burden of showing that the manufacturer negligently pre-
pared the vaccine or failed to provide an adequate warning of the
risk associated with its use. Difficulty in proving negligence for
failure to warn has increased as a result of judicial acceptance of
the learned intermediary doctrine. 7
The result of these common law developments is that plaintiffs
injured by an AIDS vaccine may not be able to satisfy their bur-
den of proof and will not be compensated by vaccine manufactur-
ers. As a result, injured parties may have to rely on other forms of
compensation, such as government assistance programs."' Fur-
thermore, while recovery from vaccine manufacturers for negligent
preparation and failure to warn is justified and is effective as a
means of providing incentives for safer practices, a number of
individuals will be injured by vaccines despite proper preparation
and administration."7 Thus, reliance solely on the traditional tort
those who were not immunized).
168. RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 402A cmt. k.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 57-81. Much of the common law precedent
dealing with vaccines and vaccine manufacturer liability comes from California. See supra
notes 48-52, 71-81 and accompanying text. Although many other jurisdictions have fol-
lowed the lead of the California courts, nothing prevents other states from breaking with
these precedents. For instance, different courts could adopt different methods of applying
§ 402A, comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Some scholars continue to sup-
port the approach of the Kearl court, see supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text, even
though that case is no longer controlling in California since the decision in Brown v.
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). See, e.g., Newhard, supra note 121, at 916;
Mariner & Gallo, supra note 156, at 22. The Kearl approach could be adopted in whole
or in part by another jurisdiction.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 57-69. The learned intermediary doctrine shields
a manufacturer from liability if the manufacturer provides adequate warning of all known
consequences of using the vaccine to the party distributing the vaccine, usually a family
physician or government health agency.
171. A dramatic shift in the sources of funding for treatment of AIDS patients has
already been documented. Between 1984-85 and 1986-87 the proportion of inpatient care
for AIDS treatment financed by Medicaid rose from 25% to 41%. Jesse Green & Peter S.
Amo, The 'Medicaidization' of AIDS, 264 JAMA 1261 (1990). Over the same period, the
proportion of AIDS care financed by private insurance dropped from 49% to 43%. Id.
172. CHILDHOOD IMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 21-23.
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system may leave many injured by an AIDS vaccine without an ef-
fective means of obtaining compensation.
2. Increased Costs to Vaccine Manufacturers
If parties injured by an AIDS vaccine were limited to recovery
solely through traditional tort causes of action, vaccine manufactur-
ers could expect an increase in the number of lawsuits. Notwith-
standing the difficulty plaintiffs may have succeeding on their
claims, injured parties faced with no alternative methods of com-
pensation are likely to find litigation a more attractive alternative
than foregoing the possibility for compensation altogether.73 The
experience of childhood vaccines manufacturers prior to implemen-
tation of the National Vaccine Program supports this scenario.174
Increased litigation against vaccine manufacturers would increase
their costs of operation. As a result, manufacturers may find con-
tinued production of vaccines unreasonable. 75
Even though the common law imposes a high burden of proof
in a case against a vaccine manufacturer and thereby decreases the
potential for large damage awards, 76 the costs of defending
against a large number of lawsuits might be substantial enough to
force a manufacturer to withdraw from the market.177
If manufacturers of an AIDS vaccine were "forced" from the
market by excessive legal costs, there would likely be a ripple ef-
173. Injured parties who have private insurance or are eligible for government assistance
would, of course, be able to rely on those sources to pay expenses incurred in treating
the injury caused by the vaccine.
174. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
175. Such a situation lead to the DPT vaccine supply crisis in 1984. See supra notes
116-18 and accompanying text. Similarly, distribution of the swine flu vaccine was de-
layed because manufacturers were not able to obtain liability insurance without guarantees
from the government that the manufacturers would not be liable for injuries caused by
adverse reactions to the vaccine. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
176. As demonstrated by the holding in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d
1318 (Kan. 1986), courts are less willing to let large jury awards stand against vaccine
manufacturers where the vaccine-related injury is one for which the manufacturer can
claim the protection provided by comment k.
177. Manufacturers of childhood vaccines faced litigation costs of $4.7 million and $9.8
million, respectively for 1983 and 1984 in defending against tort claims resulting from
adverse reactions to vaccines. These costs were one reason that many manufacturers chose
to leave the market. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 85-87. It is impossible
to predict the litigation costs an AIDS vaccine manufacturer might face. However, absent
any government program designed to limit liability claims, manufacturers of an AIDS vac-
cine can anticipate substantial litigation expenses if there are any adverse reactions to such
a vaccine.
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fect increasing the "costs" to the general public of vaccine-related
injuries. First, vaccine manufacturers would likely lay off workers
employed to make vaccines and shift their production efforts into
more profitable areas of business.17 8 Second, manufacturers and
researchers might discontinue work on new, safer or more effective
vaccines out of fear they would be subject to large legal expenses
if they chose to enter the AIDS vaccine market. As a consequence,
vaccine development would be delayed, at best, and could be pre-
vented completely. Third, some of those individuals unable to
obtain the AIDS vaccine would, presumably, develop AIDS. Not
only would society be faced with the cost of treating the dis-
ease,179 but individuals in the prime of their lives would be un-
able to work or support a family,"s adding indirectly to the costs
of AIDS.
3. Scientific Uncertainty
The last major problem with reliance solely on common law
forms of recovery is that vaccine manufacturers could be liable for
injuries not caused by use of their vaccines.18 For instance, re-
cent research suggests that the causal connection between the per-
tussis vaccine and injury to the brain could be "chance temporal
associations of neurological conditions that occur in the target age
178. As the nation's experience with childhood vaccines demonstrates, manufacturers will
not hestitate to leave a market where the cost of doing business is unreasonable. See
supra note 116 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Institute of Medicine's 1985 report
Vaccine Supply and Innovation, supra note 115, suggests that through the 1970's and the
early 1980's research and development of pharmaceutical products other than vaccines in-
creased while research spending on new and improved vaccines remained steady or de-
clined. Id. at 46-49. This shift of resources suggests that manufacturers have found other
areas of the drug business more profitable.
179. The estimated lifetime medical costs for an individual with AIDS range from
$20,320 to $147,000 per patient. Seage et al., supra note 3, at 835. As advances in
treatment of AIDS lengthen the life expectancies of those inflicted, the lifetime costs of
care will rise. Id. at 838.
One report suggests that the lifetime cost of treating those individuals already diag-
nosed with AIDS will top $4 billion. Id. at 839. Using this study's estimated lifetime cost
of $42,399 for treatment of an individual with AIDS, id., and assuming that 1.5 million
additional cases of AIDS will develop among those already infected with M-V, id. at 835,
the estimated cost of treating just these individuals could exceed $50 billion. These fig-
ures will grow as the number of those infected with HIV continues to increase. Thus, it
is clear that an effective AIDS vaccine could save society billions of dollars and, con-
versely, the price of manufacturers' withdrawal from the AIDS vaccine market because of
extraordinary legal costs would be substantial.
180. Current data from the Centers for Disease Control indicate that 76 percent of men
with AIDS are between the ages 25 and 44; 71 percent women with AIDS are in this
age group. 11VAIDS SURVEI..ANCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
181. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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group, even in the absence of immunization.""8 2 These findings
have led to at least one commentator to demand that the "national
nonsense" of linling pertusis immunization to encephalopathy be
stopped and to call for a change in the Vaccine Injury Table...
to reflect this new evidence.184
These studies reassessing the causal link between a widely used
vaccine and certain maladies later detected highlight the possibility
that an AIDS vaccine could be incorrectly linked with adverse side
effects. Under a common law means of recovery, a manufacturer
who produces and markets an AIDS vaccine believed to cause cer-
tain injuries could incur legal costs for medical problems not actu-
ally caused by the vaccine. Although the possibility that injuries
will be mistakenly linked to the AIDS vaccine may be remote,
such a connection would subject manufacturers to costs they should
not have to bear. As a result, society's resources would be ineffi-
ciently allocated and manufacturers would have a legitimate excuse
to stay out of the vaccine market and avoid unwarranted liability.
4. Economic Structure of Vaccine Marketplace
Much of the preceding analysis regarding the effect of the
common law on vaccine manufacturers is based on the assumption
that potential liability for adverse reactions to vaccines is the major
reason manufacturers are hesitant to enter or remain in the mar-
ket.8 5 However, liability costs explains only part of the turmoil
182. Golden, supra note 165, at 854.
183. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
184. James D. Cherry, M.D., Editorial, 'Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy': It Is Time
to Recognize It as the Myth That It Is, 263 JAMA 1679, 1680 (1990) (suggesting the
need for development of new vaccines to stop the many unfortunate reactions that are
caused by the pertussis vaccine).
185. See supra notes 121, 135 and accompanying text. In 1985, the Institute of Medi-
cine reported that vaccine operations at major pharmaceutical companies are "responsible
for a disproportionate number of liability claims (about 40 percent) or related costs (e.g.,
insurance, about 60 percent) when compared with their pharmaceutical operations, even
though the vaccines contribute[d] significantly less to total sales (5 to 15 percent)." VAC-
CINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 53.
It should be noted that the Institute of Medicine derived these figures from infor-
mation it collected in a survey of the pharmaceutical industry. Id. The author of this note
was unable to locate any economic information relating to the vaccine market which did
not involve some form of voluntary participation by or on behalf of vaccine manufactur-
ers. Although the source of available data raises the possibility that the data could be
skewed in favor of the position that liability claims are a major reason for manufacturers'
unwillingness to enter or remain in the vaccine market, there is no indication that the fig-
ures reported by vaccine manufacturers were incorrect or intentionally misleading.
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in the vaccine market. In addition to liability concerns, manufactur-
ers also face problems with property rights for newly developed
vaccines and related products. Moreover, safety regulations have in-
creased the cost of developing new and improved vaccines and the
size of the vaccine market does not provide an opportunity for
large profits. These factors have also contributed to manufacturers'
reluctance to participate in vaccine development and marketing.
Vaccine manufacturers protect their property rights in newly
developed vaccines by obtaining patents." Traditionally, the gov-
ernment granted process patents for vaccine products. Process pat-
ents protect a manufacturer's method of producing the vaccine
rather than the vaccine itself."s However by denying patent pro-
tection for a vaccine itself, a competitor can enter the vaccine
market and offer the same vaccine as long as it is not manufac-
tured in the manner protected by the process patent.18 Thus, the
competitive advantage the developer of the new vaccine originally
enjoys can be quickly eroded. The Supreme Court's holding in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty'8 9 that living things are patentable may
provide vaccine makers greater protection for their property inter-
ests in their vaccines. Vaccines, which are often processed from
components of living organisms,"9 may qualify for patent protec-
tion under Diamond. Such protection should provide an incentive
for manufacturers to move back into the vaccine market.
The increase in safety regulations and testing requirements 91
which accompany the marketing of any new vaccine also acts as a
barrier to innovation and spending on vaccines.' 2 The additional
costs imposed by these regulations are borne solely by manufactur-
ers and force manufacturers to compare expected future revenues
with current costs of testing.' 93 However, recent regulations pro-
vide manufacturers the opportunity for expedited testing of new
186. VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 50. Patents are valuable to
manufacturers because they keep competitors from copying the products produced by the
patent holders.
187. Id. at 51.
188. Id.
189. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
190. VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 51.
191. See Katzenstein et al., supra note 1, at 576-86.
192. VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 52.
193. Id. Calculation of future benefits is a complicated and risky endeavour. Not only is
the market for a vaccine dependant upon consumer demand, but it is always possible that
a competitor could develop a more effective vaccine thereby rendering worthless the vac-
cine being tested.
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drug treatments for life threatening and debilitating diseases, includ-
ing AIDS.' 94 Accelerated testing of a new AIDS vaccine could
allow producers to avoid much of the "gamble" associated with
developing new vaccines because the potential costs and benefits
would be realized earlier. Manufacturers should experience less
uncertainty when attempting to project future returns on current
vaccine innovation investment if their cost and benefit projections
span a shorter period of time.
As previously discussed, the market for vaccines is directly
related to the size of the target population for treatment with the
vaccine.195 In addition, eradication of a disease, which is the goal
of any vaccination plan, works directly against the continued suc-
cess of a particular vaccine's market.1" When a disease no lon-
ger poses a public health problem, as is the case with smallpox,
the market for the vaccine which prevents it disappears."9 Al-
though the need for treatment through vaccination continues for
many afflictions, such as the childhood diseases, the potential for
eradication remains one of the major economic factors working
against a healthy vaccine market. Additional factors affecting the
vaccine market include a movement away from preventive care in
the United States19 and reluctance of individuals to be immu-
nized out of fear of adverse reactions."
Clearly, the problems surrounding the vaccine market are multi-
faceted. It is impossible to point to any one factor as the reason
manufacturers are hesitant to enter or remain in it. However, sur-
veys and commentaries from executives at pharmaceutical compa-
nies suggest that a primary concern with the vaccine market is the
194. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314 (1988).
195. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. See also VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNO-
VATION, supra note 115, at 52 (discussing the factors affecting the size of the vaccine
market).
196. VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 34.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 35. The Institute of Medicine cites the decreased emphasis on preventive
care in the United States, illustrated by an over-emphasis on diagnostic and therapeutic
treatment, as one reason for an unstable vaccine market. Id. In addition, most health in-
surance plans do not provide reimbursement for preventive care such as immunization, but
are geared to pay for acute care instead. Id.
199. Id. Failure to be vaccinated is an example of the classic "free-rider" scenario. As
individuals are immunized, the odds of catching a communicable disease decreases. Id. at
35. Since the individual benefit of being immunized is less than the social benefit of hav-
ing an immunized population, there is less incentive for an individual to risk the possibili-
ty of suffering an adverse reaction to a vaccine. Rather, the individual will enjoy protec-
tion from the disease by relying on others to be vaccinated. Id.
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unstable liability situation.2" The lack of independent data
verifying vaccine manufacturers' claims regarding liability raises
some question as to whether these concerns are founded in fact or
are overstated in an attempt to influence future legislative initia-
tives.20'
Whatever the cause of problems in the vaccine market, it is
imperative that manufacturers remain in it. Given the experience of
the early 1980's with the DPT vaccine shortageF° and the drastic
decrease in the number of firms manufacturing vaccines,2' it is
clear that steps should be taken to minimize at least one key draw-
back of participation in the market - liability. Reliance on the
common law to compensate those injured by correctly prepared
vaccines is not sufficient to balance a healthy vaccine market with
just compensation to the unfortunate individuals who suffer adverse
reactions. Government intervention is required to provide a reliable,
stable means of compensation.
B. A Government Sponsored Insurance Program
The preceding section of this note established that reliance on
common law causes of action against vaccine manufacturers may
result in those inadvertently injured by a vaccine being denied
compensation.' The compensation fund approaches developed by
the National Vaccine Program and the California Vaccine Victims
Compensation Fund satisfy this goal through use of self-sustaining
insurance pools funded by those who use the vaccines.
1. Spreading Risks
The primary goal of insurance is to spread the risks of an
activity over a population so that no one individual has to bear the
full cost of an injury. °' All parties bear the cost of the activity
equally. This scheme guarantees some level of compensation to all
parties who participate in an insurance program. Developing a
200. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
201. Data is available to show the cost of vaccine-related litigation during the early
1980's, see supra note 121, and to show the cost of compensating those injured by the
swine flu vaccine, see Reitze, supra note 86, at 184. However, this data was also sup-
plied by vaccine manufacturers and may be subject to bias. See supra note 185.
202. See supra notes 116-18, and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 166-72.
205. S.S. HuEBNER et al., PRoPERTY AND LIABILrTY NSuRANcE 4 (3d ed. 1982).
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successful insurance plan requires that the drafters have an ade-
quate appreciation of the risks involved in the activity covered.2°
By anticipating future risks, insurance plans spread the costs of
injuries among members over time before injuries are sustained.
Creating insurance to accompany immunization programs
spreads the risks of vaccine-related injuries and compensates those
injured. In addition, insurance would provide a "buffer" for vaccine
manufacturers against liability claims resulting from adverse reac-
tions.2'° However, as the swine flu experience demonstrated, de-
termining the risks of immunization will be a difficult task.2° In
contrast, the National Vaccine Program indicates that diseases
which are well understood and for which adverse reactions to vac-
cines are highly predictable are amenable to an insurance-type
compensation fund.2'
Because scientists do not understand AIDS very well,21" even
when a vaccine is developed, there will likely be some uncertainty
as to its effectiveness.211 In addition, it is possible that some un-
206. Id. Since no AIDS vaccine is currently available, it is impossible to evaluate the
risks associated with such a vaccine. Developing an insurance program at this time is
therefore problematic. However, by designing a flexible program, its administrators should
be able to adapt the plan to the actual level of risk as that information becomes apparent.
207. Both the National Vaccine Program and the California Vaccine Victims Compensa-
tion Fund provide those injured by vaccines with some method of recovery. The history
of each program's development, however, reflects a governmental objective to provide
vaccine manufacturers a stable business environment. The federal government instituted the
National Vaccine Program only after the DTP vaccine crisis of the mid-1980's. See supra
notes 116-18 and accompanying text. Similarly, in the findings accompanying the AIDS
vaccine compensation legislation, the California legislature expressly acknowledged that
market disincentives may keep an AIDS vaccine from coming to market without govern-
ment intervention. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.450)-(t). See also supra note
147 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unexpected
consequences of the swine flu immunization. Before immunization commenced, there was
no known correlation between the swine flu vaccine and Guillian-Barr6 Syndrome. See
also NE STADT & FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 117 which suggests that the outcomes of
an immunization program involving -slippery diseases" are difficult to project. AIDS clear-
ly qualifies as a "slippery disease" because of scientists' lack of understanding of it. See
supra notes 1-3.
209. Scientists' years of experience dealing with childhood diseases makes it possible for
them to accurately predict the number of cases of inadvertent injuries due to vaccination.
These predictions, in turn, enable calculation of the excise tax which finances the com-
pensation fund. The excise tax is, in effect, the insurance premium that all individuals re-
ceiving a vaccine must pay. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note I and accompanying text.
211. The efficacy and safety of any new vaccine are regulated by the Public Health
Service and the Food and Drug Administration. Katzenstein et al., supra note 1, at 578-
79. As part of the licensing process, all new vaccines must complete clinical trials during
VACCINATING AIDS VACCINE MANUFACTURERS
expected side effects will result from such a vaccine.212 These
factors weigh against reliance on an insurance-type approach to
compensate injured vaccine recipients because unknown risks make
premium calculations difficult.2" 3
However, the alternatives to an insurance approach, which
include not releasing the vaccine or relying solely on the common
law system, also have drawbacks.2"4 Thus, it is incumbent upon
government to determine the preferable policy. If an insurance-type
approach is selected, the insurance fund should be flexible so that
it can be adapted to unexpected developments.215 The National
Vaccine Program makes allowances for changed circumstances by
requiring the director of the National Vaccine Program to contin-
ually evaluate childhood vaccines for safety and efficacy and to
coordinate research to improve vaccines.2 6 In addition, the sol-
vency of the program is insured by setting a limit on the number
which the effectiveness of the proposed new vaccine is evaluated and its relative safety is
examined. Id. at 580. These steps are intended to determine not only the efficacy of a
new vaccine but to allow researchers to examine possible adverse reactions to a vaccine.
Id. However, as the swine flu experience demonstrated, it is not always possible to pre-
dict all adverse reactions in a controlled population study. See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG,
supra note 6, at 100.
212. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the inexact nature of vaccines as a method of
treatment
The unique nature of IV and the strong public pressure to dispense an AIDS vac-
cine which is likely to accompany the development of such a treatment could lead to dis-
tribution of an AIDS vaccine without full understanding of all possible side effects. Re-
cent regulations allow for expedited use of new drugs for treatment of life-threatening and
seriously debilitating illnesses. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,515 (1988) (interim rule). Under these.
rules, clinical testing continues after conditional approval of the treatment. Thus, even as
an AIDS vaccine approved under these rules undergoes further official testing and licens-
ing procedures, recipients could develop unanticipated side effects.
213. See Nicholas A. Christakis & Morris J. Panner, Appropriate Collaboration between
Industry and Government in the Development of an AIDS Vaccine, 17 LAW, MED &
HEALTH CARE 130, 133 (1989) ("[Elpidemiologic uncertainty illustrates the difficulty in
using a compensation fund to make proper allowances for injuries caused by a new vac-
cine.")
An insurance approach like the California model may be inadequate to satisfy all the
claims made against it. The California compensation fund is designed to operate only as
long as monies from the excise tax are available. CAL. HEALTH & SAFELY CODE
§ 199.50(o). Insufficient funding could prevent injured parties from receiving compensation
and could force some of those parties to seek government assistance.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72, 178-80.
215. See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 6, at 118-26 (suggesting that continuing
review of any large scale immunization program is essential to quickly adapt to changed
circumstances).
216. See 42 U.S.C §§ 300aa-2(a)(l)-(9) (detailing the role of the Director of the Na-
tional Vaccine Program).
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of claims that can be satisfied each year.217 If the California
AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund is actually employed to
provide protection against adverse reactions to an AIDS vaccine,
the administrators of the fund218 should be willing to change the
amount of the surcharge per dose to reflect the true costs of the
vaccine. Alternatively, the administrators should be prepared to
limit the amount of compensation distributed so that the fund re-
mains solvent if the number of claims exceeds projections.219
2. Adequacy of Compensation
A second important issue which will arise in developing an
insurance method of compensation for injuries caused by an AIDS
vaccine is the amount of compensation to provide. Potential plans
could offer unlimited recovery for all expenses incurred, predeter-
mined levels of compensation or recovery limited by a cap on the
amount of compensation available to individual claimants. Both the
National Vaccine Program and the California AIDS vaccine plan
have adopted variations of the third option.'
Each of the three compensation plans possesses advantages and
disadvantages. The unlimited recovery approach ensures that injured
parties are fully compensated for their injuries. However, this ap-
proach complicates attempts to predict the costs of the program. As
seen in the swine flu situation, failure to limit the amount of re-
covery may lead to unexpected liability and costs far in excess of
those anticipated.?1
217. See supra notes 137, 212 and accompanying text.
218. The California compensation fund is administered by the State Board of Control.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.50(b)(2). The AIDS Vaccine Injury Compensation
Policy Review Task Force, however, has the responsibility of making policy recommen-
dations regarding the operation of the fund. Id. § 199.50(n).
219. Although the California plan does not set a limit on the number of claims that can
be satisfied each year, the AIDS Vaccine Injury Compensation Policy Task Force does
have authority to make recommendations regarding the operation and administration of the
compensation fund. Id. § 199.50(n)(2). Presumably, the Task Force's authority includes
regulation of the number and size of damage awards that can be paid from the fund.
220. For a description of the compensation system provided by the National Vaccine
Program, see supra text accompanying notes 127-35. See supra text accompanying notes
150-52 for a description of the compensation program of the California AIDS Vaccine
Victims Compensation Fund.
221. In 1976, Congress appropriated $135 million dollars to administer the Swine Flu
Vaccination Program. See supra text accompanying note 85. As a result of its assuming
liability for injuries from the vaccine, the federal government had paid out almost $83
million to satisfy judgments and settle claims as of 1985. See supra text accompanying
notes 103-05. Legal fees added another $100 million to the program's costs in the same
[Vol. 42:207
VACCINATING AIDS VACCINE MANUFACTURERS
A system providing predetermined compensation is easy to
administer because a party must only show eligibility in order to
recover. However, this type of plan could also be potentially ineq-
uitable. In order to remain solvent, such a program would necessar-
ily mandate a low level of compensation so that all parties would
receive some benefit or, if a higher level of compensation was
chosen, charge a 'larger "premium" up front to cover the costs.
Under either option, if the severity of injuries varies but the com-
pensation remains static, individuals with relatively minor injuries
would receive a windfall while those with more severe injuries
would be under-compensated. Under-compensation would be es-
pecially prevalent if the fund were insufficient to provide awards
large enough to satisfy the needs of those with severe injuries.
Trading larger awards for higher premiums may not be a better
option because the higher the "premium," the more likely that
certain parties would be unable to participate or that the cost of the
program would become altogether prohibitive.
The method of compensation adopted by both the national and
California programs is reasonable because payments to injured
parties reflect the actual costs incurred by the claimants. This
scheme prevents less severely injured parties from receiving a
windfall. In addition, a cap set on the total amount of compensa-
tion available makes it easier for administrators to maintain the
solvency of the fund. On the other hand, this method of compensa-
tion is more difficult to administer because individual evaluations
must be made of each injured party. Furthermore, the maximum
award available may not be satisfactory for those with the most
severe injuries.' -
3. Exclusivity of Compensation
The final issue involved in evaluating an insurance-type com-
pensation program is the extent to which it provides an exclusive
source for recovery. One of the major goals of any insurance fund
approach is to stabilize the costs of an immunization program to
both the recipients and the manufacturers of vaccines.' As pre-
viously discussed, one of the primary reasons for the national and
period. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
222. This problem is likely to be especially acute in a program involving diseases and
vaccines with which the medical community has little experience, such as AIDS.
223. Cf HEnuNER, supra note 204, at 6 (explaining how insurance helps contain costs
incurred by property owners).
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California programs' adoption of an insurance fund was that vac-
cine manufacturers are hesitant to enter or remain in a market
where their costs are unpredictable.' The insurance aspects of
both plans provide for a more stable environment. However, limit-
ing recovery solely to an insurance fund potentially removes incen-
tives for vaccine manufacturers to continue producing safe and
effective products.
As a means of balancing the twin objectives of stabilizing costs
and retaining incentives for manufacturers, the approach used in the
National Vaccine Program appears to be the most effective
option.' Under the National Vaccine Program, injured parties
are provided a quick method of recovery in return for waiving the
right to bring suit directly against the manufacturer. 6 Presum-
ably this provides the manufacturer a more stable business environ-
ment? 7 while minimizing the costs individuals would have to
bear. However, individuals not satisfied with the compensation
available through the fund can bring suit directly against the manu-
facturer under any theory available in the common law after waiv-
ing their rights to recover from the compensation fund. 8 By al-
lowing a suit in tort directly against the manufacturer, the appro-
priate incentives to make safe vaccines remain intact.
The California plan offers a similar method of recovery. How-
ever, under this program an injured party may seek recovery from
both the compensation fund and the manufacturer concurrently. 9
The fund is entitled to indemnification up to the amount it pays
out to an individual from any amount that recipient recovers from
224. For a discussion of vaccine manufacturers reaction to highly variable transaction
costs in the vaccine market, see supra notes 119-21, and accompanying text. See also
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45(k)-(1) (stating the California legislature's finding
that vaccine manufacturers have been hesitant to enter new markets because of the high
costs associated with liability for adverse reactions).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 127-35 (describing the program's compensation
system). See also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21 (authorizing injured parties to bring suit directly
against vaccine manufacturers after waiving all rights to recovery from the compensation
fund).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 127-35.
227. Congress reported that since enactment of the National Vaccine Program, some
vaccine manufacturers have considered reentering the market. H.R. REP. No. 100-391(1) at
693, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2238. However, it is unclear if this trend is due
to a more stable business environment or to an increase in the size of the target market
for vaccines. See supra note 119.
228. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying note 154.
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a manufacturer.' By allowing injured parties to seek compensa-
tion through both avenues concurrently, the manufacturers may face
a more unstable environment where costs of operation will be more
variable. This could defeat the goal of stabilizing the cost of partic-
ipation in the vaccine market."'
However, this aspect of the California plan may be essential to
the solvency of the program. If injuries from an AIDS vaccine are
severe and numerous and the $550,000 compensation cap available
through the fund proves inadequate, then recovery directly from the
manufacturer could be the last avenue available for an injured
party's treatment -and maintenance other than government assis-
tance. Since the California plan retains a right to indemnifica-
tion,,' 2 the fund would be "replenished" where injured parties
succeed with recovery actions. In addition, allowing recovery from
the manufacturer provides opportunities for the market to "commu-
nicate" dissatisfaction to the vaccine producer. 3
The difference between the National and California plans arises
from the disparity of information regarding expected costs. Since
there is solid information regarding the cost of insuring against
injuries from childhood vaccines, it is easier for the federal govern-
ment to incorporate these costs upfront. This planning helps to cre-
ate an adequate fund and reduces the need for injured parties to
seek recovery directly from the manufacturer. The situation is
different with an AIDS vaccine where little information exists
regarding the costs that might be imposed on individuals. Thus, the
ability to seek recovery from the manufacturer is more valuable
because the compensation fund's solvency might depend on suc-
cessful recovery. Additionally, the level of injury resulting from an
AIDS vaccine could be so great as to require even more compen-
sation than provided by the fund. Regardless, the dual recovery
aspect of the California plan may remove the protection from un-
controlled liability and legal costs which vaccine manufacturers
seek.234
230. See supra text accompanying note 153.
231. It is unclear whether parties would seek recovery from the manufacturer if quick
and adequate compensation is available through the compensation fund. Thus, the number
of individuals who seek recovery from both sources concurrently may necessarily depend
on the type and severity of adverse reactions to an AIDS vaccine.
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(k).
233. Plaintiffs seeking recovery in a tort action who are unable to satisfy the burden of
proof applicable against vaccine manufacturers would have to rely solely on the compen-
sation fund or turn to government assistance. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
234. See McKenna, supra note 44, at 963 (criticizing the California plan of "dual recov-
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C. Proposals for Future Legislation and Policy Decisions
The choice between relying on common law to compensate
individuals injured by an AIDS vaccine or developing an
insurance-type compensation fund must be made by
policymakerss The widely acknowledged benefits of vaccina-
tion' suggest that it is in the interest of all parties to have the
government provide an insurance fund to compensate individuals
injured by an AIDS vaccine. 7 An insurance fund which allows
a manufacturer to successfully market an AIDS vaccine will satisfy
the public health goal of preventing the spread of the disease and
reducing health care and other costs associated with treating those
infected with AIDS and, at the same time, will provide a stable
marketplace in which vaccine manufacturers can operate.
The unique epidemiology and uncertainty surrounding the AIDS
virus suggest that a compensation fund designed to satisfy these
goals must be flexible and capable of responding quickly to chang-
ery" as leading to increased litigation); Mariner & Gallo, supra note 156, at 24 (arguing
that the California plan provides inadequate protection for both vaccine recipients and
manufacturers).
235. In its analysis of vaccines and the vaccine market, the Institute of Medicine con-
cluded that policymakers have a "responsibility to develop some means of compensating
those with vaccine-related injuries." VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115,
at 136. To this end, ten possible policy alternatives were suggested: (1) a supplementary
(non-exclusive) compensation system; (2) a compensation system with restricted tort op-
tions; (3) mandatory claim review by a compensation board with a tort option; (4) a vac-
cine supply public insurance program; (5) promotion of no-fault insurance for vaccine-
related injury; (6) a supplementary compensation system and a vaccine supply public
insurance program; (7) a vaccine supply public insurance program and promotion of no-
fault insurance for vaccine-related injury; (8) changes in the tort law relating to liability
for vaccine-related injury; (9) federal assumption of liability for all vaccine-related injury
and (10) acceptance of vaccine price increases to cover liability costs. Id. at 159. After
considering each alternative, the Institute of Medicine supported a compensation plan that
would assist those injured by vaccines without imperiling the vaccine industry and that
would accept the reality that proving causation in vaccine injury cases is not always pos-
sible. Id. at 152. This recommendation was directly related to the development of the
National Vaccine Program.
236. See id. at 18.
237. One of the factors which supports a compensation fund-approach is that immuni-
zation programs are often mandatory or strongly encouraged by the government. Thus,
vaccine recipients do not fieely choose to be subject to the risks of vaccination. Id. at
151. Also, vaccination programs are geared to enhance public health. Not only does the
recipient of a vaccine benefit, but society benefits from the decreased spread of disease.
Thus, while society benefits from successful immunization programs, an individual injured
by a vaccine could be forced to bear this cost by himself. Id. The common-law is inca-
pable of compensating all individuals injured by vaccines. Id.
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big circumstances. To this extent, the model suggested by the
National Vaccine Program is ineffective.238 The National plan is
designed for vaccines and illnesses which are predictable and well
understood. In addition, the National plan is designed to handle a
limited number of adverse reactions each year.239 However, the
method of funding the National program and the exclusivity of
compensation under the plan are useful attributes for any future
AIDS vaccine compensation fund.
The California AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund, to
the extent that it is modeled after the National plan, is also flawed
as a policy option for an AIDS vaccine. It lacks the flexibility
needed to deal with a disease which is not well understood.'
However, with slight modifications it could prove a useful model
upon which other state or federal AIDS vaccine compensation
funds could be based. Additionally, analysis of the swine flu expe-
rience offers useful insights into issues that policymakers should
consider.
1. Recognize Uncertainty
AIDS is an elusive disease which medical experts know rela-
tively little about. Thus, any policy must maintain some degree of
flexibility so as to be able to adapt to new information and
changed assumptions. Along these lines, future legislation should
avoid establishing arbitrary values for compensation or for the size
of the excise tax which will be necessary to maintain a compensa-
tion fund.24'
The California plan's selection of a $550,000 cap on compen-
sation and an excise fee of no more than $10 do not take account
of the uncertainty surrounding this disease. As the swine flu expe-
238. See supra notes 122-43 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
240. NEUSTADT & FINEwERG, supra note 6, at 12.
241. See NEUSTADT & FIN ERG, supra note 6, at 116-22. Neustadt and Fineberg sug-
gest that updating the assumptions upon which an immunization program are based is es-
sential. Id. at 117. In particular, they advocate consideration of supplemental opinions
from outside the core group of experts charged with responsibility for the program to
prevent only one point of view being considered. Id. at 120.
Ongoing opinions by outside experts will require continual and independent evalua-
tion of the number and severity of expected adverse reactions to an AIDS vaccine, the
amount of compensation which should be provided by the fund and, most importantly, the
necessity for continuing to distribute the vaccine. It is conceivable that after distribution
of the vaccine commences, new information may suggest an alternative or that costs of an
AIDS vaccine may begin to outweigh the benefits provided.
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rience demonstrated, it is essential that the assumptions upon which
decisions are based continually be reexamined. Thus, when deter-
mining how to compensate injured parties and how to fund the
insurance program, a careful analysis of all information available at
the time should be made.
The job of determining the appropriate method of funding a
compensation program and the size of awards should be made by
the legislature, based upon the advice of appointed health care
experts and other interested parties.' The advisory committees
designated by both the National Vaccine Programa 3 and the Cali-
fornia plan2' should be required to solicit the advice and opinion
of other interested parties. This will help insure that a number of
views are considered.24
2. Target Specific Population Groups for Treatment
One legacy of the swine flu experience is that a large scale
immunization program may not be required to protect the general
population from AIDS.2" Rather, by targeting the groups most at
risk for catching and transmitting the disease, the goal of protecting
the general population might be achieved. 247
In addition, by inoculating a subgroup of the entire population,
242. AIDS activists, epidemiologists, health care providers, and public health officials are
among the individuals which would comprise this group.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2.
244. CAL. HE.ALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(n).
245. The California Plan creates an advisory group to be comprised of fourteen indi-
viduals who represent various interest groups and are directed to "make recommendations
on the legislative implementation of the fund.. . ." Id. Although this group provides a
broad spectrum of views, there is still the possibility that an institutional mentality will
develop among board members. To circumvent this potential problem, the advisory com-
mittee should be required to hold public meetings at which open debate is permitted.
246. See NEUSTADT & FINBERG, supra note 6, at 27. In analyzing the appropriate meth-
od of immunizing the nation against swine flu, one expert suggested selectively adminis-
tering the vaccine to high risk groups. Id. This suggestion should receive serious consider-
ation when an AIDS vaccine becomes available for general use. Rather than proceeding
with a large-scale immunization program, perhaps only those groups most susceptible to
infection with HIV should be immunized. See HIv\AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 11. The use of selective immunization is essentially a medical decision which
depends on the epidemiology of the disease.
247. One of the major goals of any vaccination program is to provide herd immunity.
Herd immunity means that those individuals immunized against a disease are unable to
spread the disease to those not immunized. Thus, unimmunized individuals are effectively
immunized against the disease because there is no one capable of spreading it. See VAC-
CM SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 35 (discussing the factors that would
cause an at-risk group to participate in a vaccination program).
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experience with the vaccine can be obtained without putting every-
one at risk of being harmed by a vaccine that is not completely
understood. Further, by limiting the size of the group immunized,
the insurance fund has a better potential to remain solvent because
the fewer people vaccinated, the fewer the injured parties who
would have a claim for compensation.
3. Funding
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of compensating those
suffering from AIDS vaccine-related injuries is determining how to
fund such a program. Following are three alternatives, each of
which puts the burden on a different "player" in the immunization
process. After considering each option,' this note concludes that a
combination of funding methods produces the optimal result.
a. Subsidy to Vaccine Manufacturers
The first method of compensating those with vaccine injuries
would involve subsidizing vaccine manufacturers from general
revenues and then requiring the manufacturers to compensate those
injured by vaccines they produced. Under such a program the
government would provide a subsidy to vaccine manufacturers with
the understanding that the manufacturer was free to use the subsidy
only for research into developing safer and more effective vaccines
and to compensate those suffering adverse reactions to vaccines
they had produced. As a further condition of receiving the subsidy,
the vaccine manufacturers would have to agree to compensate those
suffering vaccine-related injuries in accordance with a compensation
schedule.
The rationale behind such a funding alternative is to provide an
incentive for manufacturers to produce safe vaccines. If a given
manufacturer produced a vaccine which caused few injuries, it
would be free to keep the entire subsidy. However, if its vaccines
caused adverse side effects, the manufacturer would be forced to
pay for the injuries. Under a worst case scenario, a manufacturer
would be forced to use both the entire subsidy to compensate
injured parties and additional funds from the corporate coffers. By
placing the manufacturer "at risk," the incentive would clearly be
to produce the best vaccine possible.
A subsidy approach to providing compensation might attract
more manufacturers into the market and lead to safer, more effec-
five vaccines. The chance to receive a research subsidy would
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create an incentive to enter the market for a manufacturer who
feels it has a safe and effective AIDS vaccine. On the other hand,
the "at risk" effect of the subsidy approach could be a disincentive
for manufacturers to enter the market. The random method in
which adverse reactions to vaccines occur24' could saddle some
manufacturers with a disproportionate share of the compensation
burden while providing a windfall for those manufacturers whose
vaccines fortuitously lead to fewer adverse reactions.249
b. General Appropriations
Because vaccines are designed to reduce the spread of dis-
ease,' it is only reasonable that society in general bear some of
the burden of compensating those injured by an AIDS vaccine."
Thus, another method of funding a vaccine injury compensation
program would be to rely on monies from general tax revenues.
Under such a program, the cost of compensation would be deter-
mined each year and funds would be set aside during the annual
budget process. Under this approach, the government would pay for
any claims against the manufacturer from the annual fund directly
to the injured party.
This form of funding, however, has a number of disadvantages.
Currently, both the federal and state governments are facing huge
budget deficits. 2  In an effort to solve these problems,
248. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIATIONS, supra note 5, at 21-33.
249. The effect of the random occurrence of adverse reactions would produce a lottery
atmosphere in the vaccine market. Each year, manufacturers would be uncertain whether
they were going to be "winners" and keep the research subsidy or be "losers" and have
to use the subsidy to compensate injured parties.
The lottery analogy is useful as an example of the potential inequities of a subsidy
program. However, it assumes that the distribution of adverse reactions was truly random.
If there was some proven connection between a certain manufacturer's vaccine and ad-
verse reactions, the subsidy would be an effective incentive for manufacturers. The party
with the better vaccine would be at a competitive advantage since it would be able to
keep the subsidy and apply it to research and development. Likewise, consumers would
realize which manufacturer had the superior product and this would be reflected in the
manufacturer's sales and profits. The manufacturer with the less effective vaccine would
either develop a more effective version or leave the market.
250. See VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 115, at 18.
251. See Alexander M. Capron, Different Compensation Approaches to Bad Outcomes
from Standard Treatment, Innovative Treatment, and Research, in MEDICAL INNOVATION
AND BAD OUTCOMES: LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSES 145, 156 (Mark Siegler et
al. eds., 1987) (contending that -once most people are vaccinated, it can be argued that
an individual exposes him- or herself to unnecessary risk by being vaccinated and is at
that point only providing a benefit to society .. ).
252. See Priscilla Painton, A New Pragmatism, 137 TIME 50 (Mar. 4, 1991) (recounting
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policymakers are looking for opportunities to cut spending, not to
increase it. Although an AIDS vaccine would likely lead to large
savings in government provided health care costs,2 3 it is uncer-
tain whether funding for an injury compensation program which
ultimately provides benefits for only a limited group of individuals
could gain the support necessary to establish it or be properly
allocated if approved.' In addition, the initial uncertainty as to
the number and cost of adverse reactions would make it difficult to
budget the appropriate level of funds for such a program.
c. Excise Tax
The final option for funding a vaccine injury compensation
program is for the government to charge an excise tax on each
dose of vaccine administered. This is the method used by the Na-
tional Vaccine Program 5 and the California AIDS Vaccine Vic-
tims Compensation Fund. 6 An excise tax is an appealing form
of funding because the parties receiving direct personal benefit
from being vaccinated are bearing the cost of compensating those
injured by adverse reactions." In addition, an excise tax substi-
tutes for general revenues.
The disadvantages of an excise tax are related primarily to the
uncertainty of adverse reactions to an AIDS vaccine. If the number
and severity of adverse reactions is high, the excise tax will have
to be adjusted to compensate for the additional cost. Theoretically,
the excise tax could be raised so high that certain individuals
would not be able to afford the vaccine. In addition, if the govern-
the level of fiscal problems facing many states and the tough budget decisions facing
elected officials).
253. See generally Green & Amo, supra note 171 (documenting the shift toward gov-
ernment as payer for medical care of people with AIDS).
254. This comment assumes that an AIDS vaccination program would be targeted at a
limited population. If a broader immunization program was undertaken, it is likely there
would be more support for funding a vaccine injury compensation program.
The individuals likely to be targeted for receipt of an AIDS vaccine, homosexuals
and intravenous drug users, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.45-.51, would not
be popular groups, politically, to receive special appropriations. In a time of fiscal crisis,
programs aimed at helping small numbers of beneficiaries are likely to be less popular.
255. See supra text accompanying note 136.
256. See supra text accompanying note 151.
257. Of course, this ignores the fact that society as a whole benefits from immunization
through decreased transmission of disease. See VACCINE INNOVATION AND SUPPLY, supra
note 115, at 18. On the other hand, because governments are likely to be primary pur-
chasers of an AIDS vaccine, society would, in essence, contribute to the compensation
fund. Id. at 156.
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ment was the major purchaser of an AIDS vaccine, it might decide
that immunization against the AIDS virus was not economically
prudent. If the size of the excise tax forced the government to
suspend nationwide immunization, there would likely be an in-
crease in the number of cases of AIDS. Finally, because of a high
cost precipitated by the excise tax, vaccine manufacturers could
face a decreased demand for their product.
d. Solution
Development and distribution of an AIDS vaccine will benefit
every member of society. In addition, the manufacturers of an
AIDS vaccine stand in a position to reap substantial profits from
distribution of an effective vaccine. Thus, it is only reasonable that
funding for a vaccine injury compensation program should be
borne by all parties involved, vaccine recipients, society as a whole
which benefits from reduced transmission of AIDS and vaccine
manufacturers. To this end, a compensation program funded
through a combination of government subsidies and an excise tax
should be an equitable method of distributing burdens and provid-
ing appropriate incentives.
Under this type of financing scheme, the subsidies to manufac-
turers would provide an incentive to develop safe and effective
vaccines. 8 In addition, because manufacturers benefit from the
sale of their vaccines, it is reasonable that they should be responsi-
ble for some of the costs from adverse reactions. 2 9 As for the
portion of society which indirectly benefits from an AIDS vaccine
through herd immunity, the subsidy would be financed through
general revenues. This segment of the population would be helping
indirectly to support the compensation fund.
An excise tax should also be an integral part of the financing
for a compensation program. Those individuals actually receiving
an AIDS vaccine benefit from this treatment should bear part of
the cost of compensating injured parties. Determination of what
portion of the compensation plan should be financed by subsidies
and what portion supplied through an excise tax is a question for
policymakers.
A recurring problem with any method of funding a compensa-
tion program is how to deal with the uncertainty of the demand.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 248-49.
259. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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As discussed previously, there is no way of knowing the number,
severity or cost of compensating those injured through adverse
reactions to an AIDS vaccine.2" This highlights the need to
maintain flexibility in determining the distribution of burdens and
benefits and to review periodically the goals and methods of the
compensation program.
V. CONCLUSION
New breakthroughs in the prevention of illnesses and diseases
of all sorts are pending. The spread of these illnesses will presum-
ably be curbed by vaccines. However, as the childhood vaccine
experience demonstrates, there will most likely be a few unfortu-
nate individuals who will have adverse reactions to these vaccines
and either develop the illness against which the vaccine was ad-
ministered or manifest some other injury. Given the acknowledged
social benefits that vaccines produce, it is incumbent upon govern-
ment to provide a marketplace where vaccine manufacturers will
feel comfortable operating and where the cost of doing business is
not unduly burdened by astronomical litigation and damage award
expenses.
A successful plan to deal with an AIDS vaccine and manufac-
turer liability should recognize the difference between diseases with
well established, successful vaccines and those diseases for which
vaccines have only recently been developed and for which the
epidemiology of adverse reactions is not as well known. For dis-
eases which have long been treated with the same vaccine and
where adverse reactions are documented and predictable, a program
similar to the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Act would
probably be effective. This system provides compensation for in-
jured individuals from an established fund and an alternative mech-
anism for recovery if one desires to seek recovery directly from a
manufacturer. In addition, it provides manufacturers with a stable
litigation environment.
In contrast, new vaccines such as a long-awaited AIDS vaccine
should be handled differently. Because adverse reactions to new
vaccines and the epidemiology of the underlying disease itself will
not be well established, it will be difficult to quickly identify and
compensate injured victims. For vaccines which fall into this cate-
gory, a more flexible approach is needed. Specifically, the assump-
260. See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.
253IM9]
254 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:207
tions upon which compensation is made must continually be evalu-
ated. Later, as more data on the exact number and nature of inju-
ries from vaccination become available, more precise compensation
arrangements can be substituted.
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